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Neoliberal Feminism 
 
Kalpana Wilson 
 
Abstract 
Tracing a complex  trajectory from 'liberal' to 'neoliberal' feminism in development, this 
article argues that approaches to gender which are currently being promoted within 
neoliberal development frameworks, while often characterised as 'instrumentalizing' gender 
equality, in fact rely upon, extend and deepen gendered inequalities in order to sustain and 
strengthen processes of global capital accumulation in several ways. This is explored 
through development discourses and practices relating to microfinance, reproductive rights 
and adolescent girls. Drawing on examples from India, the article goes on to reflect on 
experiences of collective movements in which the assumptions underpinning this 'Gender 
Equality as Smart Economics' approach are challenged. Finally, it highlights several 
concepts associated with Marxist, Black, Postcolonial and Queer feminisms and underlines 
their importance to projects seeking to critically redefine development, arguing for a radical 
reappropriation of gender in this context. 
 
‘Greater gender equality can enhance productivity, improve development outcomes for future 
generations, and make institutions function better’ - World Bank report on ‘Investing in 
women’s reproductive health’ (Grépin and Klugman, 2013:3)  
 ‘It was observed in this study that in peak period, women agricultural labourers had 
worked for 14-18 hours (per day) while in lean period it came down to 14-16 hours….The 
study investigated the leisure time spending of women agricultural labourers ... The 
interesting part of the study is that the time spent was sometimes non-productive like 
gossiping, sleeping, playing cards and watching TV... (this time) can otherwise be utilised by 
making best use of it to earn more and live better’- Report published by the Government of 
Odisha, India (Mishra, 2008:56) 
 
This article examines the incorporation of gender as an important category within 
development discourses, structures and practices, with a particular focus on the selective 
appropriation of elements of feminist thinking within contemporary neoliberal approaches to 
development. It suggests that characterizations of these current approaches as 
‘instrumentalizing’ gender equality, or as rooted in liberal feminism, are insufficient: in fact, 
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these approaches rely on, reinforce and extend unequal gendered structures and relations. It 
illustrates this through discussion of three important development interventions: microfinance 
and Self-Help Groups; contemporary population policies; and the current focus on the 
adolescent girl in the global South as the idealized ‘agent’ of development. It then considers 
some examples of collective movements which directly challenge the neoliberal model of 
development, within which gender relations have been sought to be redefined in ways which 
make the neoliberal ‘Gender Equality as Smart Economics’ approach untenable. 
Foregrounding the historical and ongoing co-existence of multiple feminisms, the paper 
argues for a need to go beyond critiques of co-option, and highlights the indispensability of 
key concepts associated in particular with Marxist, Black, Postcolonial and Queer feminisms 
to projects which seek to critically redefine development.  
 
For the purposes of this article, I treat critical development thinking in two interrelated ways. 
Firstly, I use it to refer to critique of development itself as a complex of unequal material 
relationships and processes which structure engagement between the global South and the 
global North, as well as the primary discursive framework within which these relationships 
have been constructed for more than sixty years. Development conceptualized in this way is 
inextricable from the rapidly shifting and mutating operations of global capital, and should be 
understood in relation to concepts of imperialism and ‘race’, rather than, as in much 
development discourse, as an alternative which renders these concepts invisible (Wilson, 
2012). At the same time I use the notion of critical development thinking to draw attention to 
resistance to global capital accumulation and struggles for transformative structural change in 
these relationships, and to the visions of altogether different forms of development which 
frequently inform this resistance.  
 
 
FROM LIBERAL TO NEOLIBERAL FEMINISM? HISTORICAL TRAJECTORIES 
OF GENDER IN DEVELOPMENT  
 
Standard genealogies of gender and development theory and practice identify two key stages: 
the drive to include ‘women’, a previously excluded category within development, leading to 
the establishment of ‘Women in Development’ (WID) approaches; and, via Women and 
Development (WAD), the subsequent replacement of WID by ‘Gender and Development’ 
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(GAD) which shifted the focus from ‘women’ to unequal gender relations and from demands 
for inclusion to gendered critiques of development models themselves.
1
 
 
Although this was a period in which contesting models of development struggled for 
dominance, the focus of initial feminist critiques was the Cold War modernization approach 
which was integral to the promotion of US economic and geostrategic interests in the global 
South. Ester Boserup’s seminal study Women’s Role in Economic Development (1970/2007) 
questioned the way development theory, policy and practice ignored and marginalized 
women’s role as producers. Even in the context of sub-Saharan African farming systems 
where women played a central part in cultivation, she argued, colonial and post-colonial 
administrators assumed women’s place was in the home. These preconceptions meant that 
policies such as those relating to the introduction of cash crops and the promotion of new 
technology in agriculture ‘promoted the productivity of male labour’ while excluding 
women. 
  
This notion of exclusion was the starting point for the Women in Development (WID) 
approach, which combined equity and efficiency arguments to call for women’s inclusion in 
the processes of modernization. WID advocates suggested that prejudice and stereotyping by 
development planners and employers meant that women were excluded from participating in 
the productive sphere, where they could prove just as efficient and productive as men. WID-
based initiatives focused on women’s education, training and access to technology which 
would make them more productive and improve their access to the market. In practice this 
often meant handicrafts and small-scale income-generating projects. As Kabeer (1994) notes, 
the WID approach is rooted in two interconnected sets of assumptions: those of neo-classical 
economics in which individuals are utility maximizing and economic growth comes from the 
exercise of individual choice supported by the institutions of private property and the free 
market; and those of liberal feminism which emphasizes women’s capacity for rational 
thought and action and seeks equality with men in the public sphere. Thus WID identified 
discrimination against women within the development process, but did not place it in the 
context of gendered structures of power, or relate unequal gender relations to those of class, 
race or imperialism. The challenge to this approach mirrored and extended contradictions 
within feminist movements globally, in particular the debates between liberal and Marxist 
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Miller (1995). 
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feminists, and the critiques which Black feminists in North America and Europe, and 
feminists located in the global South, were articulating in relation to the dominant narrative 
of liberation and ‘global sisterhood’ (Sen and Grown, 1985).   
 
While most mainstream accounts tend to treat the Women and Development (WAD) 
approach as a necessary detour, which countered WID’s embrace of markets with an 
emphasis on women’s exploitation as intrinsic to processes of capitalism and imperialism but 
failed to sufficiently critique intra-class gender relations (Rathgeber, 1990), this overlooks 
some of the complexities of WAD. In particular, the analyses of Mies (1982, 1986), drawing  
on her ground-breaking study of  women lace makers in Central India, explored how both 
local gender relations which constrained women’s mobility and global capitalist 
characterizations of women’s work as unproductive ‘housework’ generated expanded profits 
for capital on a world scale. As Bair (2010) notes, this foreshadowed some of the key themes 
of later feminist analysis of globalization and global value chains. 
 
For WAD theorists, then, it was evident that rather than focusing on inclusion of women in 
processes of capital accumulation, these processes and their gendered implications must be 
problematized (Beneria and Sen, 1981). The socialist feminists who participated in the 
groups DAWN (Development Alternative with Women for a New Era) (Sen and Grown, 
1985) and Subordination of Women (Razavi and Miller, 1995) agreed with this. But they 
argued for more detailed attention to the specificities of particular places and times, 
suggesting that WAD theorists over-generalized the effects of both capitalism and patriarchy 
(Kabeer, 1994); this would lead to a shift away from the central focus on capital 
accumulation on a global scale which characterized WAD. 
 
It was the Gender and Development (GAD) approach that emerged from these groups which 
became established as the most influential critique of WID. GAD prioritized the recognition 
of the sphere of social reproduction which remained invisible or naturalized in WID 
approaches. For example, income-generating projects targeted at women often increased 
women’s overall work burden by failing to recognize the reproductive labour they were 
already undertaking. Within this framework, the GAD approach critiqued the tendency of 
WID initiatives to treat ‘women’ as a homogeneous category with shared interests, and to 
promote policies which addressed them in isolation, failing to recognize gender as a socially 
constructed and dynamic category. GAD analysis of women’s participation in the labour 
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market looked at how gender relations in the household and beyond both affect and are in 
turn affected by the nature of this participation and the particular conditions under which it 
takes place. GAD scholarship also focused on the household as an arena of inequality and 
conflict. Rejecting the neoclassical model of the household as a unit characterized by 
altruism, in which all members seek to maximize a joint utility function, it highlighted the 
unequal gender distribution of resources and power within households. It was argued that 
members of households had differential bargaining power, which depended on the ‘value and 
visibility’ of their labour (Kabeer, 1994). Regional differences in gendered labour processes 
and household structures which shape ‘appropriability, control and autonomy at different 
stages of household resource management’ were highlighted (ibid.: 117; Kandiyoti, 1988). 
  
While the language of gender and development and a stated commitment to gender 
mainstreaming came to pervade development discourse and policy, in practice, WID 
approaches, which were more compatible with the neoliberal turn, remained dominant within 
development institutions such as states, the World Bank and other international organizations, 
and the majority of NGOs (Chant and Sweetman 2012). However,  more recently, as we will 
see, globally dominant development institutions have been promoting a much more explicitly 
neoliberal approach to gender, epitomized by the World Bank’s slogan ‘Gender Equality as 
Smart Economics’ (World Bank, 2006; World Bank, 2011) and the current corporate-initiated 
global development focus on adolescent girls. Smart Economics is premised on the 
assumption that women will always work harder, and be more productive, than their male 
counterparts; further, they will use additional income more productively than men would. 
Therefore it argues that greater gender ‘equality’, understood as an increase in women’s 
participation in labour markets, will have a significant impact on economic growth. Within 
these approaches, I suggest here, even the liberal feminist critiques of existing capitalism 
implied in WID thinking are excised. They do not simply ‘instrumentalize’ and dilute gender 
equality objectives and neglect questions of consciousness in favour of an exclusively 
material understanding of empowerment, as critical GAD researchers and practitioners have 
argued for some time (Cornwall and Edwards, 2014). Rather, these approaches to gender, and 
the specific models of material development they are embedded in, rely on, and actively 
reinforce and extend, existing patriarchal structures and gendered relationships of power.  
 
As I explain below, neoliberal practices and discourses of gender and development are deeply 
racialized in their production of hyper-industrious, altruistic entrepreneurial female subjects 
Comment [PB1]: Not in References; 
only Chant 2006 in Refs 
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who are now represented alongside, while by no means fully displacing, earlier constructions 
of ‘third world women’ as the passive recipients of development, devoid of agency, which 
have been a focus of post-colonial feminist critiques (Kapoor, 2008; Mohanty,1986; 
Spivak,1988). The failure of WID and subsequently GAD to challenge the racialized power 
relations inherent within the project of development (White, 2006) informed these critiques, 
notably Mohanty’s influential ‘Under Western Eyes’ in which she argued that  ‘third world 
women’ are constructed within gender and development discourses as ‘a homogeneous  
“powerless” group often located as implicit victims of particular socio-economic systems’ 
(Mohanty, 1986: 338), waiting  to be liberated by Western feminists, in a  reiteration of 
missionary women’s narratives of rescue and salvation (Abu Lughod, 2002). The impact of 
post-colonial feminism contributed to a much greater emphasis on identifying women’s 
agency in GAD thinking from the late 1980s onwards. 
  
However, as I have argued elsewhere, this came to be subsumed into what was effectively the 
reinstatement of liberal theory’s rational individual exercising ‘free will’ and maximizing 
self-interest within GAD. Influential GAD theorists’ growing emphasis on women’s rational 
decisions and ‘choices’ to conform to gendered expectations or collude in the oppression of 
other women legitimized the gradual marginalization of questions of both structural violence 
and the production of gendered subjectivities.
2
 Increasingly, gendered compulsions on 
women to work harder than their male counterparts and to expend more of their resources on 
their children were instrumentalized and celebrated as ‘efficiency’ rather than being 
questioned. This made their ideas particularly amenable to incorporation within neoliberal 
frameworks (Wilson, 2008). 
 
The increasingly ubiquitous citation of women’s agency and empowerment in discourses of 
development was also consistent with a shift in neoliberal development policy in the 1990s. 
With evidence of deepening poverty resulting from the neoliberal policies of the 1980s, the 
World Bank and other institutions sought to address poverty in a way which retained the 
neoliberal model intact, and in fact could further extend the gains of global capital. This was 
variously known as the Post-Washington Consensus, the new poverty agenda, or the New 
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 As Deniz Kandiyoti (1998) argued in a reflection on the widespread adoption of her concept of the 
‘patriarchal bargain’ (Kandiyoti, 1988), a focus on ‘subordinates’ rational decisions to conform rather 
than rebel’ can mean ‘concealing the evidence of hegemony by relabelling its effects’. It is this 
tendency to ‘relabel’ the effects of hegemony and inequality as ‘choice’ which has made discourses of 
agency in gender and development thinking so amenable to appropriation within neoliberal models. 
7 
 
Social Policy. In this framework, empowerment and participation were closely related to 
ideas of individual responsibility and self-help. The growth of cost recovery, co-financing 
and co-management schemes along with community participation and voluntary work shifted 
the burden of responsibility onto poor households, and specifically poor women. At the same 
time, they were directly subordinated to the disciplines of the market in new ways 
(Molyneux, 2008).  
 
More broadly, the last two decades have seen a growing emphasis on the extension and 
intensification of women’s labour as central to sustaining neoliberal capital accumulation. On 
the one hand, the global contraction of the share of direct producers in profits is achieved 
through the intensification of unwaged and waged labour of women through which, 
increasingly, poor households attempt to survive (Perrons, 2012). On the other hand, the 
further incorporation of women whom processes of gendering and racialization render 
‘disposable’ workers (Wright, 2006)3 into global labour markets is seen as an important 
ongoing source for expanded reproduction of capital. These two processes taken together 
form the core of a gendered understanding of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey, 
2004; Hartsock, 2006). As we will see, these processes, rather than involving the lifting of 
gendered constraints on women’s time and mobility and the unequal division of household 
labour, actually depend on these constraints for their perpetuation.  
 
It is in this context that we can understand the emergence of the hyper-industrious 
entrepreneurial ‘girl’ from a low-income household in the global South as a central trope of 
twenty-first century neoliberalism. Just as colonial representations of contented and 
productive women workers in colonial enterprises ‘symbolically affirmed the need for 
empire’ (Ramamurthy, 2003), so these contemporary representations implicitly confirm the 
‘empowering’ potential of neoliberal globalization and erase questions of structural injustice 
(Wilson, 2011).  
 
 
GENDERING THE ‘DESERVING POOR’: MICROFINANCE AND SMART 
ECONOMICS  
 
                                                             
3 See Wright (2006) also on the use of the labour of male, mainly black, prisoners in the USA. 
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These processes are particularly evident in the remarkable rise of microfinance as a key 
development intervention. Over the last two decades, microfinance initiatives have come to 
be seen as the single most effective strategy for addressing both poverty and gender 
inequality, despite extensive debate regarding their impact. A large body of studies has 
established that actual control over microfinance loans to women is often in the hands of 
male relatives, while debt is ‘feminized’; that the poorest women are often excluded from 
microcredit groups; and that microfinance loans are rarely sufficient to generate income on a 
scale which significantly impacts on living standards (see, for example, Garikipati, 2008, 
2012; Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1996; Mayoux, 2002; Rahman, 1999; Rogaly,1996). Those who 
have remained relatively optimistic about microfinance’s ‘empowering’ potential have 
distinguished between those organizations which promote ‘social transformation’ through a 
variety of activities and those which focus exclusively on loans (Holvoet, 2006; Kabeer, 
2005). But the former have been increasingly marginalized with growing financialization of 
the sector as banks and corporates move into the field, integrating poor women deeper into 
global circuits of capital (Aitken, 2013; Kalpana, 2008; Maclean, 2010). 
 
 While these debates have largely focused on whether microfinance delivers on its promises, 
other observers have highlighted how, with its vision of women in low-income households 
‘making good’ through entrepreneurial hard work, microfinance epitomizes the neoliberal 
focus on the individual, and on moving up hierarchies rather than collectively challenging or 
dismantling them. As Karim illustrates in the context of Bangladesh, this potentially 
undermines solidarities of class and gender. Not only has the spread of microfinance projects 
reinforced the idea that responsibility for survival rests with the individual poor woman and 
not with the state, but poverty itself has been stigmatized and is increasingly portrayed as a 
source of shame and individual failure, rather than a basis on which to make collective 
claims on the state (Karim, 2008).  
 
However — and this once again reflects neoliberalism’s peculiar ability to appropriate and 
incorporate critical concepts — microfinance is also based on a reconstruction of the idea of 
collective action, one which places the self-interested individual at its centre
4
 and is 
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 Frances Cleaver (2007) provides a related discussion of this understanding of ‘individual 
participation in collective action’ in the context of community water resource management schemes.  
9 
 
increasingly mentioned in the discourse of mainstream development actors.
5
  Thus while the 
microfinance system requires the formation of groups in which all the members share liability 
for default, and thus effectively police each other, these groups are conceptualized primarily 
as collections of individual potential entrepreneurs. Further, the emergence of collective 
solidarity may actually undermine the system, for example if it disrupts the policing function 
of the group or leads to groups protecting defaulting members. This directly affects the types 
of relationships and activities which are promoted by microfinance organizations.  
 
According to a comprehensive study of Self Help Groups in India (Sharma et al., 2007) 
practices of solidarity are replaced with a ‘culture defined more by the maintenance of 
discipline and distrust as the marker of relationships between the women members’ (ibid.: 
117). The study found that, in the relatively rare instances where these groups took up issues 
beyond their financial activities, there was a limited agenda, mainly related to making 
demands for the implementation of existing service provision and questioning 
misappropriation of resources at the local level of the state (ibid.: 51–52). This is in keeping 
with the neoliberal agenda of ‘good governance’, in which civil society has increasingly 
become a site of donor intervention and direction: these NGOs did occasionally encourage 
rural poor women to challenge the state on questions of governance, but did not the operation 
of markets or the property regime — for example, redistribution of land and resources, or 
improved wages and conditions for agricultural labourers were not on the agenda (ibid.: 23–
9). Significantly, issues of gender relations within the household and domestic violence were 
generally not considered to fall within the purview of these groups, whose stated objective 
was women’s empowerment, even when these issues were raised by the women members of 
the groups. In fact, as we will see, the maintenance of unequal and oppressive gender 
relations in households is central to the contemporary ‘Smart Economics’ model of gender 
and development.   
 
Central to contemporary development approaches is a construction of ‘poor women in the 
global South’ as more efficient neoliberal subjects than their male counterparts, drawing on 
evidence that women have better repayment rates on loans, that women work harder, and 
expend less resources on themselves (in terms of leisure time as well as consumption) than 
                                                             
5 See for example Oxfam’s ‘Researching Women’s Collective Action’ project which is part of its 
‘Gendered Enterprise and Markets’ programme (http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/our-work/food-
livelihoods/womens-economic-leadership).  
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their male counterparts, and that increasing women’s access to the market and earnings will 
therefore have a far greater impact on children’s well-being.6  The moralistic overtones of the 
development literature’s oft-cited contrasts between women’s ‘good’ spending (on food, 
children’s clothes, school fees etc.) and men’s ‘bad’ spending (on alcohol, cigarettes, 
entertainment etc.) are distinct echoes of the Victorian discourses of the ‘deserving’ and 
‘undeserving’ poor, and like them, are deeply racialized in their reinscription of essentialized 
constructions of men in the global South as inherently ‘lazy’, irresponsible and preoccupied 
with sensual pleasure.
7
 
 
What this fails to acknowledge is that these widespread and well-documented gender 
disparities in the use of income and resources very clearly stem from specific patriarchal 
structures, institutions and ideologies, notably the almost universally gendered division of 
responsibility for children, and the various constructions of ‘good’ wives/mothers/daughters/ 
daughters-in-law as those who ‘make sacrifices’ for their families. This makes it particularly 
ironic that women’s greater efficiency — as workers, creditors or entrepreneurs — should be 
so frequently cited and even celebrated by feminists working within gender and development 
frameworks. In fact the relationship between oppressive gender relations and women’s 
perceived ‘efficiency’ has been explained quite explicitly by those involved in administering 
microcredit schemes in India and Bangladesh. Recent studies have highlighted that not only 
are existing gender relations often taken as given, but the strategies employed in microcredit 
programmes are actually based on the mobilization and perpetuation of these unequal 
material relations and ideologies.   
 
Karim explains how notions of women’s ‘shame and honour’ are treated as ‘collateral’ in 
ensuring loan repayments in Grameen Bank schemes in Bangladesh, describing how actions 
which members are encouraged to take against those who default  take the form of public 
shaming and ‘do not operate outside of local patriarchy but within it’ (Karim, 2008: 19). 
Similarly, in the Indian context of Self Help Groups (SHGs), Sharma et al. (2007) found this 
‘underlying gender ideology’ to be embedded in the programmes. For example, a state-level 
official in charge of monitoring and evaluation for the World Bank funded Swashakti SHG 
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 A large body of evidence from different regions suggests that this is overwhelmingly the case: see 
for example Agarwal (1994).   
7 While masculinities have been recognized as an important focus of gender and development theory 
and practice, the role of constructions of ‘race’ in shaping perceptions of masculinities within gender 
and development approaches is yet to be addressed (see Wilson, 2012: Ch. 4, for a discussion of this). 
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network was ‘adamant that inclusion of indicators of women’s status would distort the 
programme. “If we start teaching those things then our whole society will collapse and we 
will have no values and culture [left]. Whatever we do, it should not destroy our family 
system”’(Sharma et al., 2007: 102). Again, the schemes ensure repayment by targeting 
women because, as an official of Sabarkantha in Gujarat put it, ‘women can be located 
easily… they cannot run away, leaving their homes; they can be persuaded to repay more 
easily as they feel shame more quickly and consider non-repayment a matter of family 
honour’ (ibid.: 95). 
 
As these examples suggest, development strategies based on the intensification of rural poor 
women’s labour (and specifically the idea of women as ‘better’ borrowers) are also 
dependent upon their relative spatial immobility. Neoliberal economic models are based on 
the unfettered global mobility of capital and the relative immobility of racialized labour 
which, through the policing of immigration and borders, both prevents movement and 
produces migrant workers as more intensively exploitable labour. But access to spatial 
mobility is also of course highly gendered, depending upon gendered responsibilities and 
ideologies. In a wider sense, this notion of ‘not being able to run away’ from responsibilities 
is central to the construction of women as ideal neoliberal subjects and underpins the current 
focus on the adolescent girl as a reliable future investment.  
 
Gendered prescriptions about women’s use of time similarly underpin these approaches. The 
assumption that the time and energies of women in poor households in the global South are 
infinitely elastic, and can always incorporate more income-generating activity, has come to 
be taken for granted in development discourse and policy (de la Rocha, 2009), even when the 
notion of a double or triple burden (of productive, reproductive and community labour) is 
acknowledged. In an example of this approach in which the underlying moralism and 
paternalism are particularly apparent, a recent study of the conditions of women agricultural 
labourers in Odisha, India, published by the state government, noted that the women in the 
study worked for an average of fourteen to sixteen hours per day in the lean season (when 
domestic work is included), and longer in the peak season, yet still insisted that ‘leisure time’ 
income-generating activities should be promoted among them, because currently leisure time 
is ‘sometimes non-productive’ involving ‘gossiping, sleeping, playing cards and watching 
TV’ (Mishra, 2008:56)! 
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RACIALIZING REPRODUCTION AND APPROPRIATING  REPRODUCTIVE 
RIGHTS 
 
The appropriation and transformation of feminist ideas within neoliberal development 
frameworks is also evident in the contemporary discourse of reproductive and sexual rights 
and ‘choices’. A number of theorists have engaged critically with this discourse, emphasizing 
the continuing centrality of the control and regulation of sexualities to global capital 
accumulation (Lind, 2010), questioning the continuing heteronormativity of gender and 
development theories and analysis (Bedford, 2009; Jolly, 2011; Pereira, 2009) and 
highlighting that development policies relating to reproductive and sexual rights are not only 
gendered but racialized (Briggs, 2002; Wilson, 2012). This section briefly traces the 
evolution of neo-Malthusian population control policies as a racialized project of capital from 
the Cold War to their contemporary, neoliberal incarnation.
8
 
  
As we have noted, women were largely invisible in dominant post-war development 
discourses, prompting liberal feminist critiques like those which led to the emergence of WID 
thinking. However, these critiques failed to engage with women’s material and embodied 
experiences of development. ‘Third World’ women’s bodies, and specifically their fertility, 
were targeted from the very inception of post-war development by population control policies 
framed in the context of the Cold War, the reconfiguring of imperialism after formal 
colonialism, and the challenge to the existing global distribution of wealth and resources 
posed by communist movements in the global South. A number of writers have traced the 
centrality of eugenicist concepts of ‘race’ and their intimate and sustained relationship with 
neo-Malthusian theories about population, resources and the environment in shaping 
population control initiatives over the course of the last century (see for example, Connelly, 
2008; Mass, 1976; Rao, 1994; Ross, 1998). Acknowledging the centrality of always already 
gendered constructions of race to population control discourse and practice helps us to 
understand how the violence of population control against women in the global South 
(Akhter, 1992; Hartmann, 1995; Mass, 1976) and against black and ethnic minority women 
in the North (Davis, 1982;; Robertson, 1997; Stern and Platt, 2013) was sustained and 
perpetuated.  Population control discourse is marked by its reduction of ‘Third World’ 
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further back, to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see Wilson (2012: Ch. 3). 
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women to their reproductive organs, and specifically their wombs, which are pathologized as 
‘excessively reproductive’ and requiring intervention. However, a consideration of the 
resurgent focus on population as a development ‘challenge’ in the twenty-first century reveals 
a marked shift in these discourses in order to incorporate and mobilize feminist notions of 
reproductive choice. 
 
Experiences of population control policies in the 1970s and 1980s became one of the key 
markers of the deep fissures along lines drawn by ‘race’, class and imperialism within the 
women’s movement. The slogan of ‘a woman’s right to choose’ was mobilized around 
abortion rights by organizations in Europe and North America which were overwhelmingly 
white and predominantly middle class, rendering invisible the experiences of women of 
colour who were often the target of forced sterilization or compulsory use of  unsafe 
contraceptives. Eugenicist ideas have continued to shape policies promoting these 
interventions and in Europe and North America, and in Israel, Black, indigenous and 
minority women, women in prison, and women with disabilities continue to be targeted. 
(Gubrium and Ferrer, 2008; Hallgarten, 2013).  
 
Women in the global South were both denied access to contraceptive methods which were 
safe and which they could control, and subjected to the acute violence of population control 
policies in which targets were set by the international development institutions, including the 
World Bank. Forcible and coercive sterilization of urban and rural poor women took place on 
a massive scale: in Bangladesh, sterilization was in many cases made a condition for food 
relief (Akhter, 1992; Hartmann and Standing, 1985). In India, when central and state 
governments were unable to meet impossibly high targets, local administrations set targets 
for sterilizations for non-health personnel like teachers and forest officers, stopping salaries 
for non-achievement of these targets, leading to large-scale kidnappings and forcible 
sterilizations (Wilson, 1994). Coercive sterilizations have remained central to population 
policy in India, where sterilization constitutes 75 per cent of India’s total contraceptive use. A 
report by Human Rights Watch warned that further abuses would result from the effects of 
India’s commitments to lower fertility made at the 2012 World Population Summit, reporting 
that ‘in much of the country, authorities aggressively pursue targets, especially for female 
sterilization, by threatening health workers with salary cuts or dismissals’ (Human Rights 
Watch, 2012). On a national level, officially recorded deaths caused by sterilization between 
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2003 and 2012 translate into twelve deaths a month, on average, and actual figures may be 
much higher (Wilson, 2015). 
 
Population control programmes also created the conditions for large-scale testing of 
contraceptives on women in the global South, with minimal or no information being given to 
the participants in these tests (Hartmann, 1995; Mass, 1976). Where contraceptives were 
indeed found to have serious side effects, this did not discourage their promotion in the 
global South as part of population control programmes. In fact for pharmaceutical companies, 
these programmes have provided massive opportunities for ‘dumping’ drugs which have been 
banned in the global North, having been found to be unsafe. Injectable and implantable 
hormonal contraceptives such as Depo-Provera, Norplant and Net-En have been particularly 
favoured by the population establishment because they are long-acting: it was argued that in 
contrast to other methods such as the pill or the diaphragm, the woman does not have to 
‘remember’ to take it or to insert it herself. This clearly perpetuates racialized constructions 
of these women as inherently lacking the ability to act responsibly or regulate their own 
lives.
9
  
 
Until the 1990s, ‘population control’ was clearly distinguished from the notion of the right of 
individuals to control their fertility. For example, in 1984, the UNFPA’s representative in 
Dhaka, Walter Holzhausen, wrote a letter to key officials in the World Bank, USAID and 
other institutions criticizing the notion of ‘voluntarism’ in ‘family planning’ programmes in 
Bangladesh. The coercive sterilizations already taking place in the country were clearly not 
enough for Holzhausen, who wanted the government and donors to openly espouse 
compulsion (cited in Hartmann and Standing, 1985: 38). In the 1990s, however, and 
particularly after the 1994 UN  International Conference on Population and Development 
held in Cairo, population policies began to increasingly be articulated in the terms of 
reproductive rights and ‘choices’. This shift came in response to the demands of feminist 
movements which had been opposing coercive population control interventions. It can be 
analysed as part of the strategic appropriation of feminist critiques within neoliberal 
development discourses.  
 
                                                             
9
 A similar racist argument has been used to deny people in Africa access to anti-retroviral treatment 
for HIV (Wilson, 2012: Ch. 4). 
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Thus injectables and implantables are now promoted as methods which give the woman 
greater ‘choice’ and control over her own fertility (as she no longer has to directly confront 
potential opposition to contraception from male sexual partners) while, as reproductive 
justice activists note, in practice they actually shift control over her body to health 
professionals and population control institutions: the effect of injectables is non-reversible, 
and removing implants is a complex process which health professionals often refuse to 
perform when requested to do so by women experiencing debilitating side-effects (Wangari, 
2002). In the context of the undermining of already limited health services in many countries 
since the introduction of Structural Adjustment Policies in the 1980s, the follow-up services 
required for those using these contraceptives are rarely available (ibid.). 
 
The discursive emphasis on reproductive rights in development has been incorporated into 
neoliberal policies which have further intensified inequality and further constrained women’s 
choices on many different levels. It has also been accompanied by the incorporation of new 
concerns and ‘threats’ into the agenda of population control. In particular, population growth 
in the global South is now being linked to climate change, shifting attention from the role of 
corporate capital and the fact that industrialized countries, with only 20 per cent of the 
world’s population, are responsible for 80 per cent of the accumulated carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere, while ‘the few countries in the world where population growth rates remain 
high, such as those in sub-Saharan Africa, have among the lowest carbon emissions per 
capita on the planet’ (Hartmann, 2009). Related to this is an intensified emphasis on 
population control as a counter to migration from the global South to the global North.   
 
Similarly, population growth in the global South is held responsible for the escalating food 
crises generated by land appropriation by transnational corporations and foreign 
governments. While population control is being promoted on the basis that it is linked to 
declining maternal mortality and improved child survival rates, it is unlikely that this can be 
achieved without a change in the dominant economic model which could make substantial 
investment in health provision possible. But contemporary population discourse insists that 
current global economic relationships and structures of power do not need to be changed and 
World Bank and IMF-imposed policies in which health provision, along with education, 
sanitation and other essential public services, have been decimated since the 1980s (Rowden, 
2011; Stein, 2008) can remain in place. British Development Secretary Andrew Mitchell 
described population policies as ‘excellent value for money’, citing the example of Tanzania 
Comment [PB7]: Not in References 
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which he claims would ‘need 131,000 fewer teachers by 2035 if fertility declines — saving 
millions of pounds in the long run’ (Mitchell, 2011). The underlying message is that the poor 
will be taught to become ‘better managers’ of their poverty, while it will be business as usual 
for the corporates freely plundering sub-Saharan Africa. 
  
Redeploying Cold War fears about ‘young populations’ and the related ‘youth bulge’ theory 
of security threats developed by the CIA, population growth is now also linked to terrorism, 
embodied in the racialized and gendered constructions of the ‘angry young men’ it produces 
and the ‘veiled young women’ who in the future will produce yet more ‘dangerous’ children 
(Hendrixson, 2004). As Anne Hendrixson writes, ‘The implied dual threat — of explosive 
violence and explosive fertility — provides a racial- and gender-based rationale for continued 
US military intervention and US-promoted population control initiatives in other countries, 
particularly in the South. It also justifies government surveillance of Muslims and Arabs 
within US borders’ (ibid.). Racialized population control initiatives thus fit in neatly with the 
twenty-first century development/security paradigm, in which development interventions in 
the global South, now framed in the discourse of ‘rights’ and ‘choice’, are simultaneously 
projected as necessary for the ‘security’ of populations in the global North. It is in the context 
of this discourse for example, that the British Government’s then Minister for International 
Development Stephen O’Brien asserted that ‘we will not shy away from talking about 
population — about global population growth and its impacts’, adding without irony that ‘we 
are proud to be giving more women the choices they crave’ (O’Brien, 2011).   
 
The resurgent emphasis on population control in development has been marked by the 
emergence of new actors, notably the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, which has been 
instrumental in influencing the British government to take the lead in global population 
control initiatives (J.P., 2012). At the 2012 London Summit on Family Planning, the Gates 
Foundation, along with partners USAID, DfID, UNFPA, pharmaceutical corporation Pfizer, 
and the US NGO, PATH, announced a new collaboration which aims to ‘reach’ three million 
women in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia in three years with 12 million doses of Depo-
Provera (Hendrixson, 2014; Thomas, 2014) Meanwhile, DfID’s recent initiatives include a 
joint operation with Merck to promote the long-lasting implant Implanon to ‘14.5 million of 
the poorest women’ (O’Brien, 2011). Implanon was discontinued in the UK in 2010 because 
trained medical personnel were finding it too difficult to insert correctly, and there were fears 
about its safety (BBC News, 2011). As well as a series of debilitating side-effects, the 
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implant was reported as ‘disappearing inside women’s bodies’ (Filar, 2012). Merck has 
introduced a new version, Nexplanon, which, although almost identical in other ways, is 
detectable by X-ray, but it has been allowed to continue to sell its existing stocks of 
Implanon. This, then, is the drug which is being promoted in DfID and UNFPA programmes 
in the ‘poorest’ countries, despite these countries’ huge deficit of trained health personnel. In 
fact, in Ethiopia, one of the target countries, mass insertions of Implanon are part of what is 
referred to as ‘task shifting’ where hastily trained health extension workers are being made to 
take on the roles of trained doctors and nurses (UNFPA, 2010). 
  
Current population interventions by organizations like DfID, USAID, UNFPA and the Gates 
Foundation have appropriated the concepts of women’s empowerment and agency, but they 
are still underpinned by ideas about race, gender and sexuality which serve to dehumanize 
those identified as ‘targets’ for population control. The Gates Foundation has been repeatedly 
criticized for its close relationship with pharmaceutical giants, and its role in financing drug 
trials and vaccine programmes which were found to be unethical and unsafe (Vashisht and 
Puliyel, 2012). These include a clinical trial of the HPV vaccine against cervical cancer in 
India in 2009, falsely claimed to be a ‘post-licensure observational study’, for which 23,000 
girls aged nine to fifteen from impoverished communities were selected, and requirements for 
parental consent were bypassed. The trial was suspended following the deaths of seven 
adivasi (indigenous) girls (Narayana Kumar, 2014; Sarojini and Shenoi, 2010). A 
government enquiry found that the process of obtaining consent amounted to ‘covert 
inducement and indirect coercion’ (The Hindu, 2011) and expressed concerns over a ‘hidden 
agenda’ to push the expensive vaccinations manufactured by Glaxo Smith Kline and Merck 
Sharp and Dohme into India’s Universal Immunisation Programme (Rajalakshmi, 2011).   
Population control can be understood as an ongoing racialized project of capital. The current 
emphasis on reproductive choices in population policies being promoted by Northern 
governments and corporate actors represents an attempt to appropriate feminist ideas and 
reframe them to be consistent with the contemporary, neoliberal phase of this project, which 
is marked by an intensification of women’s labour on several levels.    
     
The renewed emphasis on population control is not only geared towards shifting attention 
from global capital’s responsibility for poverty, climate change and food crises. It is also a 
part of the process of ‘accumulation as dispossession’ to which the intensification of 
women’s labour is central, with responsibility for household survival increasingly feminized, 
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and with more and more women incorporated into global value chains dominated by 
transnational corporations. As in Puerto Rico in the 1950s, where coercive mass sterilization 
drives were pioneered as part of one of the earliest experiments in increasing profits by 
outsourcing manufacturing to low-paid women workers in the global South in ‘Operation 
Bootstrap’ (Briggs, 2002; Mass, 1976, 1977), a reduction in women’s fertility is being 
promoted within the ‘Smart Economics’ framework, primarily as it is regarded as facilitating 
women’s entry into labour markets and enhancing their productivity for global capital (see 
for example Grépin and Klugman, 2013). Thus it is the drive to intensify and incorporate the 
labour of women in poor households in the global South, rather than feminist concerns about 
reproductive and sexual rights, which underpins the now ubiquitous slogan of ‘investing in 
women’ within population discourse. 
 
 
‘SHE WILL DO THE REST’: REPRESENTING ADOLESCENT GIRLS IN 
DEVELOPMENT
10
 
 
Both of the interlinked concerns of neoliberal development which we have identified here — 
extending and intensifying women’s labour and controlling women’s fertility — are brought 
together in the current overriding focus on the figure of the adolescent girl as the vehicle for 
‘investment’ in future growth and the pre-eminent neoliberal subject of development. The 
rise of the ‘girl’ in development discourse and policy has been markedly corporate led. 
Although the idea that girls’ education could be an economically sound ‘investment’ in future 
reductions in the birth rate can be traced back to a 1992 speech by Lawrence Summers, then 
Chief Economist at the World Bank (Murphy, 2012), it was the Nike Foundation set up by 
Nike in 2004 which arguably led the way in focusing on adolescent girls in the global South 
more generally as the ‘solution’ to the ‘problem’ of development. The Nike Foundation, 
which was set up in partnership with the Population Council and the International Centre for 
Research on Women, went on to establish partnerships with the World Bank and DfID. 
Nike’s notion of the ‘Girl Effect’ has since been adopted and promoted much more widely by 
international development institutions. In 2007, UNICEF, UNIFEM and the WHO 
established the UN Interagency Task Force on adolescent girls. In 2008 the World Bank 
founded its Adolescent Girl Initiative, aimed at improving girls’ and young women’s 
                                                             
10
 One of the slogans of the Nike Foundation’s ‘Girl Effect’ campaign is ‘Invest in a girl and she will 
do the rest’. 
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economic opportunities. In 2010, the UK government announced that it would focus its 
development aid on girls and women (Koffman and Gill, 2013: 86). This has been followed 
by campaigns such as the UN’s Girl Up, and Plan International’s ‘Because I am a Girl’, as 
well as corporate social responsibility projects by Nokia, Chevron, Shell Oil, Exxon, Credit 
Suisse, Walmart, Intel and Goldman Sachs (Murphy, 2012). 
 
Not only is girls’ education instrumentalized as Smart Economics (Chant, 2015) but, as in the 
case of microfinance, the ‘Girl Effect’ model is predicated on the continuation rather than the 
challenging of gendered compulsions to be hardworking and altruistic. It  produces a 
similarly historically inflected subject whose seemingly infinite capacity for labour (now 
recast within the framework of entrepreneurship and choice) is both racialized and gendered 
(Murphy, 2012; Wilson, 2011). This is made explicit in the mobilization of unverifiable 
statistical ‘facts’ such as ‘when an educated girl earns income she reinvests 90% of it in her 
family, compared to 35% for a boy’ (Nike Foundation, 2006). As Murphy argues, ‘the figure 
of the racialized, “third-world girl” — typically represented as South Asian or African, often 
Muslim — has become the iconic vessel of human capital. Thoroughly heterosexualized, her 
rates of return are dependent on her forecasted compliance with expectations to serve her 
family — her ability to be thoroughly “girled”’ (Murphy, 2012). 
 
In fact, it is notable that while the Girl Effect consistently portrays girls as at risk from 
‘cultural’ practices such as early marriage and from highly racialized figures of predatory 
men in their own communities, while invisibilizing the structural causes of poverty (Wilson, 
2011), the discourse rarely questions the existing gender division of labour even as it relates 
to girls’ lives in adolescence itself. In a recent Girl Effect animated video entitled ‘Smart 
Economics’, a hypothetical girl in rural Ethiopia is portrayed as having to do ‘five times as 
many chores’ as her brother, at the expense of her studies. This situation is then shown to be 
mitigated simply by the provision of a fuel-efficient stove (with no redistribution of ‘chores’), 
and we next see her simultaneously cooking and studying, symbolically embodying the 
racialized hyper-industrious and entrepreneurial female subject (Girl Effect, 2014).   
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I would argue that the advent of the adolescent girl as the agent of development marks the 
transition from liberal to neoliberal feminism in development,
11
 in which responsibility shifts 
entirely onto the individualized figure of the girl after the initial investment in her human 
capital: ‘she will do the rest’ (Nike Foundation, 2008) and any critique of structures is 
rendered irrelevant. Even liberal feminist critiques that sought to highlight discrimination 
which ostensibly prevented markets from functioning effectively are now marginalized. The 
focus on the pre-reproductive, pre-labouring years is thoroughly neoliberal in that 
intervention via education is constructed as necessary only to produce the idealized neoliberal 
subject who can negotiate unfettered and unregulated markets with ease, while 
simultaneously assuming full responsibility for social reproduction.  
  
In this sense, the Girl Effect and other similar campaigns interpellate their largely young and 
female target viewers in the global North in new ways too, since they are constructed as no 
longer helping, or even saving, but effectively creating new agents of development through 
their transformative interventions before the beginning of their adult lives. As a number of 
writers have noted, the ‘girl’ in these discourses is in fact crucially always understood in 
relation and in contrast to her already empowered Northern counterpart, mobilizing post-
feminist discourses which assume that gender equality has been achieved in the global North  
(Koffman and Gill, 2013; Switzer, 2013). Koffman and  Gill highlight the way in which 
‘girls’ in the global North are directly addressed by extensive social media, ‘roadshow’ and 
merchandising campaigns such as the Girl Effect or the UN Foundation’s ‘Girl Up’ campaign 
launched in 2010 (Koffman and Gill, 2013). These campaigns reinforce post-feminist notions 
that women in the global North no longer experience gender inequality, oppression or 
violence: girls in the North are invited to endorse feminism but only in relation to the South. 
They themselves are represented as ‘more educated, socially connected and empowered than 
ever before’ (ibid.: 92).  
 
This interpellation also, I suggest, further highlights the ways in which contemporary 
constructions of agency within development are racialized, with the capacity for collective 
                                                             
11 Rottenberg (2014) describes ‘neoliberal feminism’ directed at elite professional women in the 
global North in which ‘other classic liberal feminist goals, such as fair treatment, equal institutional 
access, and women’s full integration into the public sphere are expediently elided, while climbing the 
power hierarchy ultimately becomes the feminist objective’ (2014: 425-6)  Such accounts, however, 
do not acknowledge that this elision has already taken place in the feminism incorporated in 
neoliberal development discourses centred around poor women in the global South. 
21 
 
and transformative, rather than entrepreneurial, agency being displaced onto apparently 
homogeneous publics in the global North (and young people in particular), who are 
increasingly invited by development institutions using the language of ‘revolution’ to 
mobilize around agendas which are consistent with the needs of global capital. This 
difference is also marked in the representation of sexuality, where post-feminist constructions 
of the ‘global girl’ as sexual subject and self-commodifier (McRobbie, 2008) stand in marked 
contrast to constructions of the ‘localized’ girl in the global South whose sexuality can only 
be a threat to the global order and who is understood solely in terms of racialized 
constructions of ‘dangerous’ and ‘excessive’ fertility, which also potentially undermines her 
productivity for the global economy (Switzer, 2013). 
 
 
COLLECTIVE MOVEMENTS CONFRONTING ‘SMART ECONOMICS’  
The appropriation of the ideas which emerge from movements with a transformative agenda 
and their incorporation into dominant narratives — a practice central to the construction of 
hegemony in a Gramscian sense — is also always a strategy to undermine and defuse critical 
concepts which challenge the basis of the existing order, and to derail or marginalize 
resistance which is informed by them; it also implies the possibility of counter-hegemonic 
interventions. This section explores the implications of this for feminism and critical 
development thinking. I first look at some examples of collective movements in India, within 
which the neoliberal model of development is directly challenged, and which seek to redefine 
gender relations in ways that make the ‘Gender Equality as Smart Economics’ approach 
untenable. My focus here is not on development interventions, but on those social 
movements which are rendered invisible within dominant neoliberal development discourses, 
and which challenge the unequal distribution of resources, the operation of markets, and the 
violence of the neoliberal state. I consider how, through sustained struggles waged both 
externally and within these movements, women have confronted the very structures and 
discourses of gendered power which underpin the production of the ‘poor woman/girl as 
efficient neoliberal subject’.   
 
One example of this can be seen in the experiences of the mainly Dalit women agricultural 
labourers who have been at the forefront of a movement led by a revolutionary left party, the 
CPI(ML), organizing around questions of land redistribution, living wages and an end to 
caste, class and gender-based violence by powerful landowning groups in Bihar in eastern 
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India (Wilson, 1999). As I have described in detail elsewhere (Wilson, 2008), collective 
engagement in these struggles
12
 has led women to challenge, in particular, the gender division 
of labour and unequal gendered access and rights to time and to public spaces which are 
central to the operation of microfinance and, more broadly, the intensification of women’s 
labour as a key strategy of contemporary capital.  
 
Some of these contestations can be understood through an analysis of the appropriation and 
transformation of  the concept of izzat (honour or respect). Within the dominant upper caste 
ideology, izzat is a feudal patriarchal concept which is closely linked to property ownership. 
While women can easily damage or destroy it if they do not conform to prescribed behaviour, 
it is essentially seen as ‘belonging’ to the patriarchal, property-owning family and its male 
members. 
  
Izzat has become a site of struggle on several levels. Among some sections of the Dalit 
communities, there has been an attempt to claim izzat in its existing form through the 
adoption of upper caste practices associated with women’s subordination, such as dowry and 
(where possible) withdrawal of women from labour outside the home.
13
 However, the izzat 
fought for by women collectively resisting the sexual violence they face as women workers in 
the fields is conceptualized differently by them: this gender and class struggle over izzat 
changes its meaning. The dominant discourse of izzat dictates that men must protect women 
from contact with ‘outside’ men in order to preserve family honour. In contrast, these 
struggles imply that a woman who leaves the ‘protection’ of the home and moves freely in 
public spaces has the right to protect herself. Thus izzat can ‘belong’ to a woman 
independently. This change becomes explicit when women demand izzat within the family in 
the context of campaigns against domestic violence.  
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 I have written elsewhere in more detail about the process through which these demands and desires 
for change were formulated and articulated, suggesting that it was catalysed by the experience of 
collective struggle, and of being able to challenge authority and bring about change (Wilson, 2008). 
13 It is important to note that, given their conditions of work and the attacks they face, women may 
themselves prefer to withdraw from paid labour. A similar point was made by black feminist writers 
critiquing the liberal feminist assumption that waged work is by definition liberating (see for example 
hooks, 1982). At the same time, since it is usually younger women, and in particular young married 
women, who are withdrawn from this work, this can also be seen as resulting in greater control over 
them by both men and older women.  
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As well as confronting the domestic violence through which compliance to gendered 
expectations is often policed, women involved in the movement repeatedly questioned the 
gender division of labour and responsibility within households which results in women’s 
primary responsibility for children’s welfare, and the absence of even the limited leisure time 
which men have, both of which affect women’s ability to participate fully in political activity 
(Wilson, 2008). The question of whether gender relations within the household should be a 
priority remained a contested one within the movement at a local level, and as I suggest 
elsewhere (ibid.) an important factor in putting these issues onto the agenda has been the 
presence of a relatively autonomous women’s organisation linked to the CPI(ML). In Bihar 
and elsewhere, women activists at the village level — particularly younger women with 
young children — who travelled widely, addressed public gatherings, assertively confronted 
officials and other powerful figures, and on occasion spent several nights away from home, 
were challenging dominant notions of the ‘good’ woman, not only in terms of space (by 
voluntarily entering public spaces for reasons other than direct economic compulsions) but in 
terms of time (in expending time on activism which would otherwise have been spent on 
domestic labour or income-generating activities). This was in many cases a continuous source 
of conflict with family members and viewed as an unresolved dilemma by the women 
themselves. Nevertheless, these women are involved in the process of formulating 
alternatives to norms of behaviour which are shaped by patriarchal ideologies and material 
structures, and are currently being reinforced, instrumentalized and extended by neoliberal 
development interventions. In these dynamic contexts, the assumptions about women’s 
behaviour on which ‘Smart Economics’ depends begin to irretrievably unravel. 
 
In a somewhat different, although related, context, the massive anti-rape movement which 
emerged in Delhi in the wake of the horrific gang-rape of a twenty-three year old student  in 
December 2012 became a site of contestation between different approaches to sexual 
violence — contestation in which these assumptions were once again at issue. The approach 
which emanated from one section of the protestors and was taken up by the state and the 
media focused on the demand that the paternalistic state fulfil its obligations to ‘protect’ 
women on the streets from violence, and on the demand for the death penalty in rape cases. 
This left intact a discourse in which women survivors could be blamed for any perceived 
violations of gendered restrictions around public space, time and behaviour. Significantly, 
young women fulfilling the requirements of the neoliberal economy by working at night in 
‘call centres and the media’ (Krishnan, 2013), were specifically highlighted as those 
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deserving protection from the state. The mobilization of ideas of ‘protection’ simultaneously 
facilitated the demonization of working class migrants to Delhi as those who perpetrated 
sexual violence (Dutta and Sircar, 2013). This ‘othering’ is inextricable from wider 
patriarchal discourses in which poor, oppressed caste and religious minority men are 
constructed as a ‘threat’ to control over women of the dominant group by  family, 
community and nation and is exemplified by the current campaign being waged against 
Muslims by the Hindu right in India around the myth of ‘love jihad’ (Dixit, 2014). 
But this was countered by a discourse which emerged largely spontaneously from the 
movement which directly challenged ‘victim blaming’. Kavita Krishnan, an activist who was 
involved in the protests from their inception, recalls how: 
Right from the start in the movement there were these slogans which were coming out 
in the movement quite spontaneously, alongside the death penalty slogans and 
posters. There were many posters hand made by women, most of them were first time 
participants from schools or colleges, young women working or studying in different 
parts of Delhi. …posters saying, ‘don’t teach us how to dress, teach men not to rape’ 
and others saying, ‘your gaze is the problem so why should I cover myself up’. This 
anger had clearly stopped being about this one rape case and punishment, it was 
actually raising larger questions about why women are put in the dock every time 
there is a case of sexual violence. (Freedom Without Fear Platform, 2013) 
 
Some commentators have suggested that these slogans remained consistent with what was 
perceived as the ‘middle class’ character of the outrage and empathy generated by this 
particular case, which continued to invisibilize the relentless sexual violence faced by poor 
and marginalized women in India (John, 2013; Roy, 2012). The problems with this critique 
go beyond the fact that the composition of the protests was much more heterogeneous than 
they imply, or even the fact that these slogans and the ideas they embody, far from being 
restricted to an urban elite, have had a remarkable resonance among women in very different 
contexts across India.
14
 What is perhaps most problematic about this approach, which 
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 For example Krishnan notes that:  
In rural Siwan, Bihar, 500 women gathered in February 2013 to protest Asaram’s visit there 
[Asaram Bapu, a ‘godman’ close to the Hindu right], incensed by his suggestion that the 
December 16
th
 rape could have been avoided if only the woman had called the rapists 
‘brother’..... Closer to home in Siwan, both Hindu and Muslim panchayat leaders had 
competed to issue ‘bans’ on women’s using mobile phones or wearing jeans or skirts. The 
women protestors not only came armed with eggs and tomatoes for Asaram; they gave 
speeches there declaring that if anyone tried to impose a ban on women wearing jeans, they 
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suggests that the movement had little relevance to broader agendas of social transformation, 
is its failure to take account of the ways in which the patriarchal regulation and disciplining 
of women seen as ‘belonging’ to dominant communities — whether around dress, entering 
public spaces, or choosing a partner — are inextricably tied to the legitimization of violence 
against those women who are represented as the ‘other’, in terms of religion, caste or class. 
In the current Indian political context, the enforcement of these patriarchal controls through 
often violent ‘moral policing’ is central to the discourses and practices of the Hindu 
supremacist forces which, particularly since the May 2014 electoral victory of Narendra 
Modi, are simultaneously extending and intensifying neoliberal policies. This should not be 
surprising in the light of the many ways in which neoliberalism, including  neoliberal 
development discourse on gender, draws upon, reinforces and is sustained by unequal gender 
relations.   
       
Further, while the protestors’ emphasis on ‘victim-blaming’ has been relatively well-
publicized and debated, there has been less acknowledgement of the way this led to an 
extension of the perceived locus of gendered violence from the street, in two directions: into 
the home and into the apparatuses of the state.  
 
Firstly, the protestors drew attention to the presence of sexual violence in domestic spaces, 
where gendered surveillance, control and violence, far from becoming anachronistic, are now 
central to the production of the altruistic neoliberal female subject. Krishnan describes 
‘slogans like freedom from the Khap Panchayats, then immediately we had girls saying 
“freedom from brothers, fathers, not just freedom from the clan body”. All these were 
challenging the notion of “the home as the safe haven”, as opposed to the unsafe streets. So it 
was also trying to make visible the violence of everyday patriarchy’ (FreedomWithout Fear 
Platform, 2013). 
 
Secondly, a significant section of the protestors went on to highlight the state as both a direct 
perpetrator of sexual violence as well as a protector of powerful perpetrators (Sengupta, 
2013). Slogans and placards demanded an end to rapes by the Army and an end to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
would beat up men who wore shorts (a reference to the RSS uniform), pants, shirts, or 
anything but ‘dhoti and khadaun’ [loincloth and wooden clogs]. Subsequently, Asaram 
himself has been arrested for raping a 16-year-old girl in his ashram. A comrade told me 
recently that in his village in Begusarai, Bihar, the Laxmi Puja pandals included figures of 
Asaram with women beating him up with footwear. (Krishnan, 2013) 
26 
 
immunity provided by the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in its occupations of 
Kashmir, Manipur and elsewhere in the North-East, and the vast tracts of Chhattisgarh 
targeted by mining corporates. They invoked the names of Dalit women raped and murdered 
by powerful landowners with state backing, and of Muslim minority women targeted in state-
sponsored violence by Hindu right-wing organizations. Migrant women domestic workers 
who participated in the protests spoke of the violence they face in the middle-class homes 
where they are employed. These interventions directly confronted the dominant discourse in 
which only rapes of women who were represented as ‘belonging’ to the nation were made 
visible. They also challenged the neoliberal conceptualization of gender inequality in which 
gender violence is perceived as an anomaly which can be mitigated by intensified 
criminalization (Bumiller, 2008; Richie, 2012)
15
 and individual empowerment via the 
market, rather than as a systemic characteristic of market, state, household and community 
structures of power, which can only be resisted through collective movements with an 
agenda for transformative change. 
 
 
RECLAIMING FEMINISM? 
 
The sustained project of appropriation of discourses of gender equality by neoliberalism 
renders concepts developed within feminism, and in particular, Marxist, Black, Postcolonial 
and Queer feminisms, all the more essential to critical development thinking and material and 
discursive practice. In this concluding section, I briefly highlight the continuing 
indispensability of three such concepts: social reproduction, heteronormativity, and 
intersectionality. At the same time I indicate the ways in which these feminist concepts too 
are highly contested ones which, if understood in isolation from each other and from the 
movements for social transformation from which they have stemmed, are inevitably 
themselves subject to processes of appropriation, incorporation and transformation, 
suggesting that ‘reclaiming feminism’ from neoliberalism is not a finite endeavour but an 
ongoing struggle.    
 
                                                             
15
 These positions were also reflected in the process of attempting to bring about changes to the law 
on rape in India. While the Justice Verma Committee set up to make these recommendations in the 
wake of the December 2012 Delhi rape case adopted many of the arguments of feminist organizations 
(for example, against the adoption of the death penalty for rape and in favour of the repeal of 
AFSPA), many of the recommendations were not ultimately not incorporated in the new legislation.   
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The emphasis which Marxist and socialist feminists have placed on the sphere of social 
reproduction as a site of gendered and embodied labour essential to capital accumulation 
(Hartsock, 2006) continues to be essential in order to displace the neoliberal claim to 
inclusion with a call for structural transformation and gender justice. The concept of social 
reproduction has been central to the project of developing a gendered critique of the political 
economy of global capitalism. It underpins analysis, firstly, of the gendered impacts of 
policies of economic liberalization and Structural Adjustment Programmes from the 1980s 
onwards which drastically reduced social provision, significantly increasing women’s 
reproductive labour as well as their responsibility for income generation (Elson, 1991) and, 
secondly, of the mobilization and consolidation of gendered divisions of labour by global 
capital in the ‘feminization of employment’, understood as encompassing processes of 
casualization, flexibilization and informalization, as well as the relative growth in the service 
sector and care work (Perrons, 2009; Sassen, 2000). It is also key to confronting policies 
informed by the ‘Gender Equality as Smart Economics’ approach which, as we have seen, 
relies on and extends precisely the same complex of gendered structures of inequality which 
feminist theories of social reproduction expose.  
 
In this context, it is also crucial to recognize and expose the heteronormativity of neoliberal 
development interventions (Bedford, 2009; Pereira, 2009) in order to resist further 
appropriations of feminist ideas. For example, Kate Bedford (2007) has described how, 
drawing on the now considerable body of work on masculinities in GAD, some World Bank 
initiatives have promoted greater involvement of men in household work in order to facilitate 
women’s incorporation into global labour markets. This is occurring in the context of even 
greater shifts away from state and corporate responsibility for social reproduction, with the 
promotion of the heterosexual nuclear household perceived as the only possible locus of 
survival for poor people. The heteronormativity of development is obscured, rather than 
challenged, however, by the rise of ‘homonationalism’ in which the notion of ‘tolerance’ of 
homosexuality is incorporated within imperialist civilizational and developmental discourses 
(Butler, 2008; Ekine, 2009; Haritaworn et al., 2008; Puar, 2004). This renders invisible the 
colonial history as well as the global political economy and geopolitics of current onslaughts 
on LGBTIQ people (Petchesky, 2014; Tamale, 2010).   
 
Clearly, it is impossible to make sense of the processes discussed above in the absence of an 
intersectional analysis. I use intersectionality here to refer not primarily to the term coined by 
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Crenshaw (1989) and since developed in several directions, but to the much longer history of 
theorizing and political practice developed in the context of Black women’s struggles in 
relation to gender, race, class and sexuality in North America, Britain and elsewhere (Davis, 
1982; hooks, 1982; Lorde, 2007). Day-to-day embodied experiences of the political economy 
of disposability, of racialized policies, discourses and practices informed by ‘Gender Equality 
as Smart Economics’ and the ‘Girl Effect’, and of neo-Malthusian population control 
policies, can only be understood through approaches which problematise the notion of 
‘women’ as a homogeneous category. Further, such approaches can be seen as always having 
been integral to the political practices we have highlighted in examples from India which 
(along with many others) counter the appropriation of feminism, and in which gender is 
experienced and understood as inseparable from structures of class, caste and community in 
particular.  
 
Yet increasingly development discourses on gender are reducing intersectional approaches to 
a multivariate ‘tool’ for ‘measuring cumulative disadvantage’, in which form they have 
recently been espoused by the World Bank (2013) in an example of what Menon (2015) calls 
‘the governmentalising of intersectionality and its attachment to funding-driven agendas and 
policy for the global South’ (2015:41). Although the ideas of intersectionality have been cited 
more convincingly in recognition of difference and the importance of location by some 
gender and development scholars, this is not sufficient for the project of exposing and 
undoing the co-option of notions of ‘gender equality’ within neoliberalism. As Mohanty 
(2003) argues in a reflection on the impact of her earlier, highly influential intervention 
‘Under Western Eyes’ (Mohanty, 1986), attention to multiple differences must be combined 
with acknowledgement of the existence of the overarching transnational structures of global 
capital and imperialism and how these are racialized as well as gendered. Mohanty (2003) 
calls for a ‘race-and-gender-conscious historical materialism’ which she argues must be at the 
core of effective transnational feminist solidarity which connects struggles across locations 
while recognizing inequalities of power and privilege. It is only within such a framework, I 
suggest, that radically reappropriating ‘gender’ from the neoliberal development project 
becomes a real possibility.     
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